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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS
Daniel A. Farber*
By William N. Eskridge,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1994. Pp. vii, 438.
$49.95.

DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION.

Jr.

Statutory interpretation, Professor Eskridge1 observes, has been
a neglected intellectual stepchild, "the Cinderella of legal scholarship" (p. 1). If so, then Eskridge himself may qualify as the messenger with the glass slipper who has rescued the waif from obscurity.
For over a decade, he has been in the forefront of research on the
subject and has played a leading role in the scholarly renaissance
now underway. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation synthesizes and
extends his far-reaching contributions to the subject.
Even beyond its theoretical sophistication and extensive scholarship, perhaps the book's most attractive feature is the internal
tension between sometimes opposing viewpoints. Eskridge candidly admits that he admires conflicting normative visions, for his
experiences have given him a prismatic rather than a unified vision:
My approach can be described as one of critical pragmatism. It reflects a balance among three facets of my life: my thoroughly middleclass background and exposure to legal work through the usual insider institutions (Ivy League law school, clerkship, tony law firm),
versus my experience as a gay man (which makes me a pariah looking
at legal practice from the outside), versus my fascination with the phenomenon of scarcity and its [economic] implications for public life.
My experience sweeps widely if not comprehensively across the
American political spectrum.2

Consequently, Eskridge•s- discussion tends to be dialectical, embracing first one viewpoint and then another. His conclusions are more
nuanced than some readers may expect from an outspokenly "progressive" legal scholar. The price of these internal intellectual tensions is a reduction in theoretical elegance and rhetorical sweep,
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty, and Acting Associate
Vice President for Academic Affairs, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D.
1975, University of Illinois. - Ed. I would like to thank Jim Chen and Phil Frickey for
comments on a previous draft.
1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Visiting Professor of Law, Yale University.
2. P. 200. Eskridge's "critical pragmatism" involves a general presumption in favor of
existing legal practices, except where those practices fail to respond adequately to excluded
groups. See text accompanying notes 57-61.
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but the result is a more fruitful and profound engagement with the
issues. Throughout the book, although Eskridge's conclusions are
often debatable, he never fails to engage opposing viewpoints honestly and to acknowledge their legitimacy.
This review begins by considering Eskridge's quarrel with his
major opponents - textualists such as Judge Frank Easterbrook
and Justice Antonin Scalia. It then probes Eskridge's understanding of "dynamic interpretation." Dynamic interpretation's distinctive feature is the view that statutory meaning changes over time,
but this view need not be hostile to the need of the legal system for
continuity and fidelity to the past. Eskridge's approach may have
roots in the activism of the Warren Court, but it also turns out to
have some intriguing affinities with the work of Alexander Bickel, a
legal-process3 critic of judicial activism. Finally, the review revisits
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 4 the leading statutoryinterpretation opinion involving affirmative action - an opinion
that has fascinated Eskridge and other interpretation scholars.
I.

DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION VERSUS NEW TEXTUALISM

In evaluating the argument for dynamic interpretation, we may
begin profitably by considering its main current competitor, the recent revival of textualism. Eskridge argues that dynamic interpretation is inevitable.5 This is a difficult proposition to establish
empirically. At least one might say, however, that textualists have
failed to provide a counterexample in their own practice of statutory interpretation. This failure is all the more revealing because
opposition to dynamic interpretation is so central to the textualist
creed. We first consider the textualists' unsuccessful effort to eliminate dynamic interpretation, and then briefly consider the arguments in favor of a dynamic approach.

A. The New Textualistism
When interpreting statutes, modern courts generally have felt
free to rely on an eclectic mix of reliance on text, legislative history,
statutory purpose, and public policy.6 This eclecticism allows room
for dynamic interpretation for judges who are so inclined. Beginning in the 1980s, textualists challenged this eclectic approach in
3. For a comprehensive discussion of the legal process school, see the introduction by
Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994).
4. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

5. To buttress this claim, Eskridge uses the history of federal labor injunctions as a case
study. See pp. 81-106.
6. For a fuller discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990).
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favor of a much more structured method of statutory interpretation.7 Their favored approach claims to be rigorously nondynamic.8
Textualists, as Judge Easterbrook has explained, stress that the
proper forum for policymaking is the legislature; the role of judges
is to apply statutes as written, without attempting to adapt them to
changing times: "Laws are designed to bind, to perpetuate a solution devised by the enacting legislature, and do not change unless
the legislature affirmatively enacts something new.... Law does
not change in meaning as the political culture changes. "9
There are several corollaries to this antidynamic thesis. Textualists maintain that the ideas of legislative purpose and legislative intent are incoherent: "Legislation is compromise. Compromises
have no spirit; they just are." 10 Hence, if the legislature has failed
to speak clearly to an issue, the argument continues, a court should
not try to fill the gap. When the court reaches the limits of a statute's clear instructions, the only thing to do is to put the statute
aside and admit that it provides no basis for ruling. 11 As Judge Easterbrook puts it, "[w]hen the text has no answer, a court should not
put one there on the basis of legislative reports or moral philosophy
- or economics! Instead the interpreter should go to some other
source of rules. "12 Refusing to stretch statutory language or fill
gaps has another major advantage: Knowing that courts will follow
only therr plain language, legislators will have an incentive to draft
carefully and precisely,13 so textualism helps foster the democratic
process.14
What this adds up to, as Judge Easterbrook puts it, is a "relatively unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation," 15 offered in the _name of upholding the legislature's monopoly on
policymaking.16 Only this mechanical approach "can be reconciled
7. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 61 (1994).
8. As Eskridge has observed, "[f]onnalism posits that judicial interpreters can and should
be tightly constrained by the objectively determinable meaning of a statute; if unelected
judges exercise much discretion in these cases, democratic governance is threatened." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 646 (1990).
9. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 69 (footnote omitted).
10. Id. at 68.
11. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533 (1983).
12. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 68.
13. See Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1022 (1992).
14. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-45 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part).
15. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 67.
16. This goal, however, is not consistent with textualists' use of substantive canons and
strong "clear statement" rules. See pp. 280-83, 297.
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with the premises of democratic governance."17 According to textualists, this approach is also consistent with the essence of the judicial function, which is to submit to "the lines of the logical and
analytical categories" and to operate under clear rules rather than
fuzzy principles.1s
The textualist vision of statutory interpretation is sharply at
odds with Eskridge's. Textualism aspires to be resolutely
nondynamic and insulated from judicial value judgments. Its aspiration to formalist simplicity is equally distant from Eskridge's
vision. Rather than seeking a cut-and-dried method of interpretation, he criticizes courts for attempting to simplify their tasks instead of engaging the deep complexities of interpretation (p. 145).
Thus, although he utilizes some of the same intellectual apparatus
as the textualists,19 ultimately Eskridge's theory is almost entirely
opposed to theirs.
B. The Failure of Textualism
Not surprisingly, textualism has not gone unchallenged.20 According to its critics, textualism fails on its own terms by leaving
judges free to inject their values into statutory interpretation. Critics charge that courts have "begun to use textualist methods of con- struction that routinely allow them to attribute 'plain meaning' to
statutory language that most observers would characterize as ambiguous or internally inconsistent," and even to attribute plain
meaning to language that "was nearly universally believed to have a
contrary meaning" for many decades.21 Others describe textualism
as increasing the tension between democracy and the rule of law
and serving "as a cover for the injection of conservative values into
statutes."22 Room for doubt exists, then, about whether textualism
is living up to the promises of its advocates.
17. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 63.
18. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 581, 593 (1989-90); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989).
19. Most notable is public-choice theory, which plays a prominent role in both Eskridge's
and Easterbrook's scholarship.
20. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 861-74 (1992); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on
Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4066 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and
the Rule of Law, 45 V AND. L. REV. 533, 549-54 (1992); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T.
Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism
in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TuL. L. REv. 803, 825-31 (1994).
21. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 (1995).
22. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 77 (1994).
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These concerns are illustrated by Justice Scalia's opinion in BFP
v. Resolution Trust Corp. 23 BFP involved a Bankruptcy Code provision that invalidates certain prebankruptcy transfers unless the
debtor received "a reasonably equivalent value. "24 The transfer in
BFP was a foreclosure sale on the debtor's real estate for a fraction
of its market value. Applying the bankruptcy provision to foreclosures had given the lower courts a great deal of difficulty because
prices at forced sales are not infrequently depressed. Some courts
had set aside such sales when the sale price was well below fair
market value.25 Others, such as the lower court in BFP, had found
compelling policy reasons for ignoring the price disparity despite
the statutory language.2 6 Justice Scalia upheld the foreclosure, but
without adopting the policy-oriented rationale of the lower court.
According to Justice Scalia, whatever amount is received in a
lawful foreclosure, however minute, is simply by definition "a reasonably equivalent value. "27 Justice Scalia argued that the value of
property inevitably is depressed if it is the subject of foreclosure
proceedings.28 "[I]t is no more realistic to ignore that characteristic
of the property (the fact that state foreclosure law permits the
mortgagee to sell it at forced sale) than it is to ignore other priceaffecting characteristics (such as the fact that state zoning law permits the owner of the neighboring lot to open a gas station)."29
Thus, under Justice Scalia's view, if a mortgagee buys the property
at a small fraction of its market value, the price paid is simply its
true value under the circumstances.
Whatever else may be said of Justice Scalia's argument, it hardly
corresponds with the textualist call for a "relatively unimaginative,
mechanical process of interpretation."30 No ordinary speaker of
English would use the phrase "reasonably equivalent value" to
mean "fair market value except in the case of a foreclosure, when it
23. 114 s. Ct. 1757 (1994).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994).
25. The leading case is Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201, 20304 (5th Cir. 1980) (setting aside sale when purchase price was Jess than 57.7% of fair market
value and indicating in dicta that any sale for less than 70% should be set aside).
26. For a discussion of pre-BFP law, see Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales
as Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV.
933, 936-53 (1985).
27. See BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1761-62.
28. See 114 S. Ct. at 1761-62.
29. 114 S. Ct. at 1762 (citation omitted). It is some indication of Justice Scalia's discomfort with his own interpretation of the statute that he explicitly "emphasize(d] that our opinion today covers only mortgage foreclosures of real estate. The considerations bearing upon
other foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example) may be different." 114
S. Ct. at 1761 n.3. As a matter of logic, of course, these other situations are indistinguishable
on the basis of Justice Scalia's rationale.
30. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 67.
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means whatever the debtor receives." At most, Scalia's argument
would support only a definition of fair value as the expected price
at a foreclosure sale, not the actual price in one particular sale.
Moreover, as Justice Souter's dissent cogently demonstrates, Justice
Scalia's interpretation of the statute simply makes a hash of Congress's deliberate decision to subject involuntary transfers to Bankruptcy Code section 548.31
As Eskridge and Frickey have observed, "BFP is an astonishing
decision for a textualist." 32 Their overall evaluation of the opinion
is biting: "By giving its policy-driven result an unsupportable formalist gloss, Justice Scalia's opinion flunks any requirement of judicial candor." 33 Harsh, perhaps, but not entirely inaccurate. If this
is what textualism can do in the hands of its foremost proponent,
we may wonder how well it will function in other hands. BFP provides little reassurance about the ability of textualism to constrain
result-oriented judges.
Textualism does, however, seem to have the ability to persuade
those judges subscribing to it that their interpretations are coerced
by the text, even when this claim objectively seems quite implausible. Consider Justice Scalia's striking dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. 34 Sweet Home
involved the Endangered Species Act35 ban on "taking" endangered species; "taking" was defined to encompass any effort to
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect."36 The Secretary of the Interior had defined "harm" in turn
to include a significant habitat modification, if the modification "actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."37 The
question before the Court was whether this was a reasonable reading of the statute. In a careful opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court
upheld the agency's interpretation of the statute.3s
Justice Scalia wrote a vitriolic dissent, which amply lives up to
Eskridge's comment that he finds the "mists of the Middle Ages"
more relevant than recent sources of law (p. 271). The centerpiece
of Justice Scalia's dissent is his assertion that the word "take," as
applied to wildlife, is "as old as the law itself" and means "to re31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1767-78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 83.
Id. at 84.
115 S. Ct. 2407, 2421-31 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
16 u.s.c. § 1532 (1994).
Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2410.
See 115 S. Ct. at 2407.
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duce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human control."39
"It should take the strongest evidence," he said, "to make us believe that Congress has defined a term in a manner repugnant to its
ordinary and traditional sense."40 This is an ipse dixit in the grand
manner. Although a reasonable member of Congress conceivably
might have had in mind the ancient meaning of the term "take" in
game law, that legislative understanding was hardly inevitable. After all, the statute was not an amendment to other game or fishing
laws but instead was an aggressive addition to federal environmental law, in the context of which the medieval meaning of the word
"take" might not have immediately sprung to the legislators' minds.
Surely, a member of Congress who wanted to know what the word
meant would have been more likely to look at the broad language
of the bill's definition than to consult a treatise on game law. Justice Scalia's reading of the statute may not be impermissible, but
under the Chevron41 doctrine, he had the burden of showing that
the agency's contrary interpretation was not merely wrong but
unreasonable.42
Justice Scalia's dissent also falls far short of overcoming the
strong textual argument in the other direction. The term "harm"
naturally encompasses habitat modification.43 It would be peculiar
to say that Mrs. O'Leary's cow did not harm the people of Chicago
when she kicked over the lantern that started the Chicago fire.
Similarly, as a matter of ordinary English usage, someone who destroys the breeding grounds used by an endangered species or eliminates its food supply surely "harms" them.
Justice Scalia's view that the statute unambiguously precludes
the agency's interpretation is at best an example of self-deception.
The reason for this self-deception is not hard to find. It leaps out of
the opening paragraph of the dissent, when Justice Scalia says the
agency interpretation "imposes unfairness to the point of financial
ruin - not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who
finds his land conscripted to national zoological use. "44 Justice
Scalia's textualism seems to have blinded him to the extent to which
he engaged in dynamic interpretation based on conservative public
39. 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. 115 S. Ct. at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
42. See 467 U.S. at 843.
43. For instance, one dictionary contemporaneous with the statute defines harm as "physical or material injury; hurt; damage; detriment; misfortune." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH
CENTURY D1cnoNARY 827 (2d ed. 1977).
44. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Statutory Interpretation

May 1996]

1553

values - values that also may command the support of the current,
rather than the enacting, Congress.45
At one point, Eskridge caustically remarks that textualism
reduces statutory interpretation "to a linguistic shell game played
by amateurs" (p. 134). Perhaps it is unfair to accuse Justice Scalia
of deliberately hiding the statutory "pea" in Sweet Home, for he
seems to have fooled even himself.46 But Eskridge's larger point
remains valid. Like other reductionist approaches to statutory interpretation, textualism fails to provide sufficient determinacy in
practice to squeeze value judgments out of the interpretative process (pp. 38-47). Like it or not, we seem to be stuck with some
degree of dynamic interpretation, even from judges who vehemently proclaim their desire to avoid it."
C.

The Legitimacy of Dynamic Interpretation

As Eskridge recognizes, assuming that some degree of dynamic
interpretation is inevitable, this fact does not necessarily mean that
it is desirable. We might instead, like textualists, want to reduce the
amount of dynamic interpretation to the minimum (p. 6). The
worry, of course, is that courts armed with dynamic interpretation
will usurp the legislature's superior position as lawmaker. Eskridge
devotes Part II of the book to exploring various jurisprudential theories, ranging from classical liberalism to critical race theory, as
they bear on this question. He concludes that under all of these
theories some form of dynamic interpretation is legitimate.
Three of Eskridge's arguments are quite simple but ultimately
quite powerful. First, even in hierarchical institutions such as the
military, lower-level agents are recognized as having necessary authority to improvise and adapt their orders to changing circumstances (p. 124). Modem organizational theory stresses the need
for flexibility and innovation by subordinates rather than centralized, top-down decisionmaking.47 From an organizational point of
view, rule-bound decisionmaking is unlikely to succeed in a diverse
or rapidly changing environment.
To show the need for improvisation in adapting orders to actual
conditions, Eskridge refers to Judge Richard Posner's analogy48 to a
platoon commander who has lost touch with headquarters in the
45. As Eskridge points out, Justice Scalia and other members of the Rehnquist Court
often smuggle in their public values through references to canons of interpretation, sometimes freshly minted, that embody conservative political preferences. See pp. 280-83, 297.
46. Justice Scalia himself has observed that he usually sees no reason for agency deference because he finds most statutes clear. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 521.
47. See Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278, 1279, 1286-87
(1993).
48. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 269-73 (1990).
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middle of a battle (p. 124). The severely disciplined German army
provides a striking example - it not only tolerated but encouraged
the exercise of discretion by subordinates during World War II.49
The French army, in contrast, was run on formalist principles, with
a highly centralized organization that could not adjust to the unexpected.50 In a "system wholly at odds with the stereotypical view of
the German army as composed of fanatical soldiers blindly obeying
the dictates of a Prussian general staff," the Germans had "remarkably little paperwork" compared with the Americans, left tactical
decisions to the officers at the front, and gave medals largely for the
exercise of initiative on the battlefield.51 This organizational system
was "well adapted to the task of getting men fo fight against heavy
odds in a confused, fluid setting far from army headquarters and
without precisely detailed instructions" and contributed to the ability of the Germans to outmaneuver larger but less flexible opponents.s2 Surely, the degree to which federal courts are subservient
to legislators cannot exceed the degree to which Teutonic lieutenants were subordinate to generals!
Second, some degree of dynamism seems inherent in the enterprise of interpretation itself. At the most abstract level, Eskridge
argues that all interpretation necessarily involves an effort to align
the world of the reader with that of the author, making static interpretation impossible (pp. 60-65). More specifically - and perhaps
more persuasively for those unsympathetic with contemporary literary theory - he points out that legal interpretation generally involves some dynamic element in areas ranging from the law of
contracts to the law of trusts (pp. 122-23). Furthermore, in other
legal systems, some with highly textualist aspirations, dynamic interpretation of statutes is well-accepted.53 Even textualists utilize
canons of interpretation that in practice provide a dynamic element
(pp. 118-19). Thus, dynamic interpretation is hardly a frightening
novelty.
Third, it is difficult to see how the legal system can function effectively without some degree of dynamic interpretation. It is impractical to revise the entire United States Code every few years;
inevitably, some provisions must be left in place for decades, if not
longer. Intolerable anomalies would develop without some way to
keep these provisions in tune with the changing legal framework
49. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 14-18 (1989).

See id. at 43.
See id. at 16-17.
See id. at 17.
Seep. 345 n.2. For further discussion, see Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist:
Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Perspective, 81 CORNELL L. REV. {forthcoming 1996).
50.
51.
52.
53.
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(pp. 48-49). Moreover, as the understandings of the law by those
involved in its everyday administration evolve over time, abrupt efforts to restore the original understanding can undo justifiable patterns of reliance by the relevant actors. Thus, as Richard Pierce
observes, for essentially conservative "rule of law" reasons, a completely nondynamic approach to interpretation would be a
mistake.s4
Those who would dismiss dynamic interpretation as a form of
judicial activism would do well to consider Peter Strauss's explanation of its traditional role in administrative law:
Administrative agencies are continuing bodies with proactive responsibilities, acting under the oversight of the political branches as well as
the judiciary. We anticipate that they will change course; they are in
effect the preferred managers of change. . . . Whatever else, the
agency . . . will not have encountered issues of statutory meaning
freed of consideration of purpose, politics, or contemporary
understandings.ss
Similarly, Strauss is critical of Justice Scalia's BFP opinion for its
reluctance to recognize the established role of federal judges as "officials with acknowledged law-generating authority" sufficient to
put flesh on the reasonableness standard of the Bankruptcy Code.56
On this score, Strauss and Eskridge are the conservatives, whose
views reflect established legal practices and traditions, while Judge
Easterbrook and Justice Scalia are the radicals.

II. THE DYNAMICS

OF INTERPRETATION

The difficult question, then, is not whether to engage in dynamic
interpretation, but how to do so, and in particular, how freely to do
so. It is easy to interpret Eskridge - dynamically - as an enthusiastic advocate of. judicial activism in statutory interpretation. Establishing the argument for dynamic interpretation is after all the
main purpose of the book (p. 5), and the word "dynamic" seems to
connote activism. This interpretation, however, misreads his views.
As we will see, Eskridge is actually somewhat cautious in his view
of the judicial role, and his work reflects some of the concerns
raised by legal process theorists such as Alexander Bickel. While
Eskridge wishes to leave room for legal evolution, he is also quite
aware of the limits of the judicial role in legal change; like Bickel,
he is not lacking in awareness of the "passive virtues."
54. See Pierce, supra note 21, at 765·66. Thus, one of Eskridge's most thoughtful critics
agrees that dynamic interpretation is appropriate, but only under more limited circumstances
than Eskridge would countenance. See John Nagel, Review Essay: Newt Gingrich, Dynamic
Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2209, 2236 (1995).
55. Peter Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP.
Cr. REv. 429, 437.
56. Id. at 454.
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A. Critical Pragmatism and the Judicial Role
Eskridge's views lay exposed to misinterpretation in part because he is attracted strongly to conflicting jurisprudential visions.
He discusses three quite different jurisprudential theories: traditional liberal theory, legal-process theory, and normativism. Each
has its appeal:
Most of us find something attractive in each one, and the three theories together more accurately capture our political society than any
one separately. We value individual autonomy (liberalism), but we
also understand our interdependence (legal process) and crave a society that stands for values we can be proud of (nonnativism). As a
result, we usually favor limited government, but endorse state regulation to address social and economic problems and to foster national
values. [p. 109]

Consequently, Eskridge calls for a "dialectic" among these theories
(p. 109). His own preferred approach is a "critically pragmatic one
in which the rule of law is grounded in and follows everyday practice, but which reevaluates practice in light of rank discriminations"
(p. 109).
Eskridge's critical pragmatism recognizes the limits on judicial
innovation.57 As he puts it, courts are pressed from below and
above in statutory cases (p. 49). From below, the Supreme Court
often finds that agencies, private actors, and lower courts already
have interpreted statutes in ways that have become deeply embedded in society (p. 66). From above, the Court's interpretation faces
the threat of being overruled by Congress. Thus, the courts normally must respect the interpretative status quo rather than upset
the balance in the name of either social progress or the original
understanding. This principle is embedded in a number of wellestablished canons of interpretation such as the following:
• Reenactment rule: when Congress reenacts a statute, it incorporates settled interpretations of the reenacted statute.
• Super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents.
• Acquiescence rule: follow unbroken line of lower court decisions
interpreting statute.
• Rule of deference to agency interpretations unless contrary to
plain meaning of statute or unreasonable. [pp. 324-25]

These rules reflect formal recognition of the broader principle that
other legal actors hem in a judge's room for interpretation.
Thus, the Supreme Court never writes on a clean slate and
never has the final word. For this reason, Eskridge endorses what
he considers the most modest forms of dynamic interpretation using
"pragmatic, situational metaphors," such as analogies to private law
57. As another reviewer trenchantly put it, "Eskridge has painted a picture of dynamic
interpretation by a nondynamic judiciary." William D. Popkin, Book Review, 45 J. LEGAL
Eouc. 297, 301 (1995) (reviewing DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION).
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doctrines like cy pres (pp. 192-93). A pragmatic interpretation is
one that "most intelligently and creatively 'fits' into the complex
web of social and legal practices" (p. 201). In most cases, Eskridge
believes, the courts should defer to settled practice, rather than
seeking to anticipate future progress.58 Quoting the Roman Emperor Hadrian, he reminds us that "[l]aws change more slowly than
custom, and though dangerous when they fall behind the times are
more dangerous still when they presume to anticipate customs"
(p. 201 ). Only in the exceptional case should judges "break away"
from current practice (p. 200).
Thus, when evaluating a possible interpretation of a statute, a
court first should consider whether the interpretation comports
with professional, social, and political practice. If the interpretation
would disrupt current practice, the court then should consider
whether such a disruption is normatively justified (p. 206). In the
typical case, the court's role is essentially conservative, not in terms
of the political spectrum, but in terms of current social practices
that the court attempts to preserve. Only in an extraordinary case
does the court contemplate disruption through interpretations that
"press beyond or criticize" existing conventions and traditions in
order to re-ground the legitimacy of the legal system in its underlying norms (p. 201).
Notably, even when disrupting current practice, the ultimate
goal is conservative rather than transformational - to preserve the
social order rather than overturn it. Both at the beginning (p. 2)
and end of the book (p. 306), Eskridge invokes Hadrian's view
about the need to attract the loyalty of downtrodden groups.
Rather than applying the law rigidly, Hadrian believed that flexibility was necessary in order to preserve the legal system's viability:
All nations who have perished up to this time have done so for lack of
generosity: Sparta would have survived longer had she given her Helots some interest in that survival.... I wished to postpone as long as
pos[s]ible, and to avoid, if it can be done, the moment when the
barbarians from without and the slaves within will fall upon a world
which they have been forced to respect from afar, or to serve from
below, but the profits of which are not for them. I was determined
that even the most wretched, from the slaves who clean the city sewers to the famished barbarians who hover along the frontiers, should
have an interest in seeing Rome endure. [p. 306]

Thus, even seemingly disruptive legal 'interpretations ultimately
may serve the long-term maintenance of the legal order.
58. 'fypically, courts lag behind rather than lead changes in the political culture, making
them unlikely candidates for a leadership role in social change. See James A. Stimson et al.,
Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. PoL. Scr. REV. 543, 555-56, 560 (1995) (arguing that the
Supreme Court reflects public opinion less than other institutions and is driven by changes in
its own composition plus rational perceptions of the anticipated effects of changing public
opinions).
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Disruptive interpretations, while unusual, are also critically important. Eskridge's views about disruption can be plumbed best by
considering two cases that he discusses extensively. Both cases involve gay rights, a cause about which he cares passionately. In both
cases, he favors an interpretation at odds with the legal status quo,
but only with misgivings.
The first of these cases is Boutilier v. INS, 59 which involved the
application of an immigration restriction to homosexuals. The statute required the Immigration and Naturalization Service to exclude
individuals found by the Public Health Service to have "psychopathic personalities," a term that Congress apparently anticipated
would include gays and lesbians. Although the Court interpreted
the restriction to apply to gay men, Eskridge believes that a dissenting Court of Appeals judge had a better view. Judge Moore had
dissented because he was reluctant to read the statute to apply to
such figures as Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo. 60 Moore was
a moderate Republican who found the exclusion policy "unnecessarily hurtful, and indeed 'wasteful and inefficient in light of the productive people it swept within its exclusionary net" (p. 202). It is
only Moore's dissent, Eskridge remarks, "that inspires admiration
today" (p. 202). In Boutilier, then, Eskridge would favor a rupture
in prior social understandings in favor of an oppressed group.61
The second case is Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 62 which was brought by a
gay rights group seeking official recognition from a Catholic university. Eskridge considers this a very difficult case because it pitted
two conflicting moral world views against each other (pp. 181, 185).
Although he finds none of the opinions in the case fully satisfactory,
he seems most drawn to the opinion of Judge Mack, who attempted
to accommodate the conflicting interests in the case and open lines
of communication between the college and the gay community.63
By excusing the University from granting formal recognition to the
gay group, she acknowledged the school's religious objections while
requiring the University to provide equal access and benefits, thus
meeting the group's practical needs (p. 178). The result of this decision was to foster a fruitful dialogue and the creation of a new consensus within the university (p. 182). Here, the best available
59. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
60. Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J., dissenting), affd., 387 U.S.
118 (1967).
61. Such a rupture ultimately took place when changed cultural and medical understand·
ings made the Public Health Service unwilling to perform its role under the statute of certifying gays as psychologically unhealthy. See pp. 66-67.
62. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en bane).
63. Pp. 188-89. Eskridge nevertheless has some reservations about Mack's opinion. See
p.192.
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judicial action was not to rupture prior traditions but to mediate
between conflicting norms.
B. Statutory Interpretation and the Lincolnian Tension
As we have seen, a central theme of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation concerns the tension between the usual role of courts as
restrained agents of tradition and their occasional need to breach
the status quo in light of fundamental moral imperatives. As
Eskridge explains, this tension is also a critical feature of legalprocess theory:
The genius of legal process theory is its ability to mediate substantive divisions through procedure and to press the polity toward· new
consensuses over time. Its danger is that procedural regularity may
become a cover for the triumph of a partial substantive position and
consensus a shield for an unjust or inefficient status quo. The challenge for a legal process theory of statutory interpretation is to find a
balance - one that must be constantly recalibrated - between procedural mediation and substantive responsibility. [p. 143]

Within the legal-process movement, Alexander Bickel most deeply
grappled with this tension.64 Despite great differences in their philosophical and political outlooks, Bickel's work finds a resonant
chord in Eskridge's jurisprudence.
Bickel believed that law must rest on fundamental principles,
but also that it must duly consider practical realities. Analogizing a
judge's position to Abraham Lincoln's on the issue of slavery,
Bickel referred to the tension between principles and practical realities as the "Lincolnian tension," which he saw as pervasive in the
Supreme Court's work.65 It is the Court's task, Bickel argued, to
resolve the "tension between principle and the hard - at any rate,
often ominous - facts of the day's politics."66 The judicial "art" is
the creative extension of the law's moral tradition to new situations
and problems, but with a prudent regard for the need to generate
societal support.67
Thus, like Eskridge, Bickel believed that the normal judicial role
is to maintain continuity with current social norms. More than Eskridge, however, Bickel doubted that the Court effectively could
force society into the future; he had little belief in "the intuitive
judicial capacity to identify the course of progress.>'68 Nor did he
64. For an illuminating discussion of Bickel's thought, see Anthony T. Kronrnan, Alexander Bicke/'s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE LJ. 1567 (1985).
65. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 68 (1962).
66. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 98
(1970).
67. See BICKEL, supra note 65, at 66-69.
68. BICKEL, supra note 66, at 173-74.
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believe that the Court had the power to compel social change.69
Bickel, however, did not see the Court as merely a passive reflection of current practices. He thought it must aspire to the role of
moral teacher,70 for society also "values the capacity of the judges
to draw its attention to issues of the largest principle that may have
gone unheeded in the welter of its pragmatic doings."71
Bickel's model of law was "flexible, pragmatic, slow-moving,
highly political"; without "pretense to intellectual valor," it rested
on a "mature skepticism" about the validity of any catechism of
moral values.72 Yet in Bickel's view, law cannot be unprincipled,
for in order to maintain its stability and coherence, a civil society
must rest on a moral foundation. 73 "A valueless politics and valueless institutions are shameful and shameless and, what is more,
man's nature is such that he finds them, and life with and under
them, insupportable." 74 That moral foundation is not, however, to
be found in abstract philosophical theory, but in an evolving tradition: "We hold to the values of the past provisionally only, in the
knowledge that they will change, but we hold to them as guides."75
Bickel was deeply concerned with how law can generate the
consent necessary to maintain the social order in a free society. Ultimately, he believed, law can operate only through consent, for a
free government lacks the power to exact obedience from large
numbers of people through direct coercion.76 As a result, when the
law sharply conflicts with the norms of a significant segment of society, a dialogue must take place between that group and the courts77
a dialogue in which civil disobedience can, within limits, play an
important part.78 A minority with intense preferences cannot be
coerced at an acceptable cost by the majority and therefore often
must be accommodated.79
As his closing quotation from Hadrian makes clear, Eskridge
also is quite concerned about how the legal system can earn the
consent of dissatisfied minority groups.so His account of the development of gay rights also has a distinctly Bickelian tone as he ex69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 91.
See Kronman, supra note 64, at 1583 & n.73.
BICKEL, supra note 66, at 177.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT

See id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
See id. at 106.
See id. at 111.
See id. at 112-14.
See id. at 102.
See p. 306. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.

4 (1975).
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plains how the legal system adapted to the demands of an alienated
minority. According to Eskridge, the social consensus in favor of
repressing homosexuality continued until the Stonewall Riot, which
began a period of gay resistance and ultimately forced a change in
social practices (pp. 53-55). In the end, rather than coming from
"above" - the courts - legal change came from "below" through Stonewall, the gay rights movement, and other acts of
resistance (p. 72). The result was to override prior legal interpretations in Boutilier and force an accommodation to gay interests in
Gay Rights Coalition. A successful disruption of prior legal practice
was mandated by the effort to maintain allegiance from the gay
community. Clearly, Eskridge's view is that it was also required by
moral principle.s1
Eskridge is surely not a reincarnation of Alexander Bickel, who
was far more conservative both intellectually and politically. What
they have in common is an abiding focus on the Lincolnian tension
between high principle and "business as usual." It is this focus that
saves Eskridge's work from becoming a banal celebration of judicial activism and provides much of the intellectual energy that pervades this book.
Ill.

WEBER: THE PARADIGM CASE REVISITED

As Phil Frickey has pointed out,82 much of the contemporary
debate about statutory interpretation has been sparked by the
Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 83 which upheld affirmative action under Title VII. 84 At least
for liberals, nowhere is the pressure for a "disruptive" interpretation so great as it is in the context of affirmative action, for nowhere
is the tension between legality in the form of text and legislative
history, and perceived morality in the form of social equality, so
severe. Understandably, Weber is a central focus of the Eskridge
book (pp. 14-47, 80, 135, 173, 303-06). In his lengthy discussion of
Weber, Eskridge seems to have two purposes. The first is to undermine Justice Rehnquist's dissent by demonstrating the existence of
indeterminacy in the statute's text and legislative hist.ory. The second is to embed Weber in a larger story about the evolution of Title
VII law. We will consider these two aspects of Eskridge's analysis
in that order, ending with a reevaluation of Weber.
81. See supra note 61 and text accompanying notes 59-63.
82. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241, 245 (1992).
83. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber was reaffinned and expanded in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). All the current casebooks on Legislation use Weber as a
principal case.
84. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
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A. Weber and Legislative Intent
To understand the problem posed by the Weber case, it is best to
begin with Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which musters the conventional tools of statutory interpretation for a powerful attack on affirmative action.85 Begin with the language of the statute. The
most directly applicable provision of the statute, section 703(d),
prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual
because of his race" 8 6 in any apprenticeship or training program the specific setting in Weber. In addition, section 703(a)(2) forbids
employers from classifying employees "in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race."87 As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, on
its face this language seemed to address the situation of Brian
Weber, who was unable to gain admission to a training program
because he was white. 88 Moreover, the legislative history contained
some powerful support for Justice Rehnquist's "color-blind" interpretation of the statute. Hubert Humphrey, "perhaps the primary
moving force" behind the bill in the Senate, explained that "the
meaning of racial or religious discrimination is perfectly clear....
[I]t means a distinction in treatment given to different individuals
because of their different race, religion, or national origin. " 89 The
Senate "floor captains" explained its provisions as follows:
[I]f a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has
an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged - or indeed permitted
- to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for
future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier. 90

In terms of the conventional indicia of legislative intent, then, Justice Rehnquist had a powerful argument against affirmative action.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court admitted the force of
this argument against the legality of affirmative action but emphasized that the affirmative action plan had been voluntarily adopted
85. For a similar analysis by a leading authority on labor law, see Bernard D. Meltzer,

The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation ofthe Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment,
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1980).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1994).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994).
88. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 226-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. 443 U.S. at 236 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CoNo. REc. 5423 (1964)).
Later, Humphrey added that quotas would not be established to maintain racial balance and
that the bill "would prohibit preferential treatment for any particular group." Weber, 443
U.S. at 243 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CoNo. REc. 11,848 (1964)).
90. Weber, 443 U.S. at 240 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CoNo. REC. 7213
(1964)) (alteration in original).
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by private parties to eliminate entrenched racial discrimination.91
Invoking the spirit of the law over its letter, Justice Brennan
stressed that the supporters of the bill had strongly desired to remedy the inferior employment status thrust upon blacks by
discrimination.92
It would be ironic indeed, if a law triggered by a Nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had "been excluded from the American dream for so
long," constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy.93

Justice Brennan bolstered this argument with a heavy reliance on
section 703(j), which says that the statute should not be interpreted
to require preferential treatment on the basis of race.94 Notably,
according to Justice Brennan, section 703 banned only mandatory
affirmative action, thereby signaling its intention to leave voluntary
affirmative action intact.95
As Eskridge remarks, Brennan's opinion is somewhat cavalier
in its treatment of the text and legislative history (p. 135). Justice
Blackmun's concurrence is more candid in its discussion of the difficulties of the case. Justice Blackmun remarked that he shared some
of the "misgivings" expressed by Justice Rehnquist about the original intentions of Congress. Nevertheless, he believed that practical
considerations, "only partially perceived, if perceived at all" by
Congress, supported the result in the case. 96 If read literally, Title
VII. would put employers in an untenable position, mandating
either liability to blacks for past discrimination or liability to whites
for attempting to remedy that discrimination. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the statute would make voluntary compliance - even in the form of a "whisper of emphasis on minority
recruiting" - dubious.97 Justice Blackmun's preference would
have been to require an arguable past violation of Title VII as a
justification for affirmative action.98 Given Congress's initial orientation toward color blindness, he found the Court's more expansive
approach to affirmative action somewhat disturbing. Yet, he was
ultimately persuaded to join the Brennan opinion.99
91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

99.

See Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
See 443 U.S. at 201-04.
443 U.S. at 204 (quoting 110 CoNG. REC. 6552 (1964)) (citation omitted).
See Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-06.
See 443 U.S. at 205-07.
443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
443 U.S. at 210-11 {Blackmun, J., concurring).
See 443 U.S. at 211 {Blackmun, J., concurring).
See 443 U.S. at 212-13 {Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Eskridge makes a concerted effort to undermine the RehnquistBlackmun view of legislative intent. As to the statutory text, he
argues that the term "discrimination" is ambiguous and might not
include bona fide efforts to promote racial equality (p. 27). As to
the legislative history, the endorsements of color blindness may
have been nothing more than "cheap talk" that did not reflect the
actual views of the majority or the leadership (p. 19). Also, pivotal
voters such as Senator Dirksen might well have endorsed Justice
Brennan's principle of managerial freedom, particularly if they had
been aware of the pressures that the disparate-impact theory of liability would place on business (pp. 24, 37).
Despite Eskridge's ingenuity and extensive research, however,
he fails to rebut Justice Rehnquist's analysis convincingly. Regarding the statutory text, as Eskridge acknowledges, a number of other
provisions buttress the word "discrimination" and strongly suggest
a colorblindness reading (pp. 42-43). The cheap-talk explanation of
the legislative history is also implausible. First, it requires assuming
that the leadership was willing to take the risk of blatantly misrepresenting the meaning of the statute. As Eskridge points out in another context, such misrepresentation is dangerous because of the
likelihood that other legislators will correct the record (p. 405
n.127). Second, by the 1960s, Congress was well aware that courts
might rely on legislative history (pp. 209, 213, 215-18, 234). Talk by
the sponsors of the bill could not be regarded as "cheap" because it
carried the known potential to modify the legal interpretation of
the statute. Finally, although it is possible that Dirksen and his cohort would have taken the position posited by Eskridge, in the end
this is a mere speculation, unsupported by any hard evidence.
To say that the evidence of legislative intent is strong is not to
say that it is utterly unambiguous or conclusive. But by conventional standards of statutory interpretation, Justice Rehnquist
clearly seems to have the better side of the argument. Thus, supporters of Weber need what Eskridge calls a "disruptive" interpretation, one that does more than implement the original expectations
of the enacting legislators.
B. Rupture or Reconciliation?
Although he does make some effort to reconcile Weber with legislative intent, Eskridge's primary historical account portrays Weber
as part of a rupture. His historical narrative begins after the passage of the Civil Rights Act. 100 As soon as the statute was passed,
key players in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and in the civil rights movement were determined to pro100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to n-6 (1994).
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mote what Eskridge calls a results-oriented approach to Title VII.
Given experience under other labor laws, they were dubious that an
intent-oriented definition of discrimination would be effective and
instead focused on statistical measures of job equality. They were
candid about the inconsistency of this approach with the legislative
compromises embodied in Title VII (p. 73).
The first fruit of this new approach came in 1971 with Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 101 which adopted the theory of disparate impact
originated by the NAACP Legal Education and Defense Fund, Inc.
According to Eskridge, Griggs was at odds with the view of the
enacting legislature and even with that of the legislature of 1971 (p.
77) - enough so that the legal community was stunned by the
unanimous decision.102 Thus, Griggs, like the later decision in
Weber, resulted from an ideological battle over the meaning of discrimination that had first been fought within the federal government and then in the private sector with less complete success.
This reworking of Title VII reached fruition, Eskridge says, in
Weber. "The thrust of the Court's opinion in Weber," according to
Eskridge, was our country's commitment to results, based on the
statute's goal of obtaining compensatory justice for an oppressed
minority (p. 40). Thus, "[d]uring the 1970s the EEOC, the Supreme
Court, and Congress worked together toward a proportional representation ideology, encoded in Title VII through the Griggs and
Weber decisions making disparate impact a. form of discrimination
and allowing voluntary affirmative action" (p. 304). In short, voluntary affirmative action was not considered a form of discrimination
(pp. 40-41). On Eskridge's interpretation, Weber was something
like Judge Moore's dissent in Boutilier:103 a fundamental reworking
of a statutory concept to correspond with more progressive social
norms.
Eskridge's interpretation seems plausible if we think only of Justice Brennan, the author of the opinion. Yet it fails when we consider some aspects of the opinion in historical context. Perhaps the
most obvious difficulty is that Justice Brennan carefully refrains
from attempting to reconcile the result with the statutory term "discrimination." His majority opinion makes no effort to read the
term "discrimination" as involving some evolving social norm of
equality, and for good reason. He simply did not have solid majority support for an expansive redefinition of the concept of discrimi101. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
102. P. 74; see also Earl Maltz, The Legacy of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: A Case Study in
the Impact of a Modernist Statutory Precedent, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1353, 1357 ("Commentators of all stripes have concluded that Congress did not consciously intend to adopt impact
analysis in Title VII.").
103. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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nation. In Bakke, 104 a majority of the Court had recently construed
a companion provision to Title VII more narrowly, with four Justices allowing no affirmative action and a fifth Justice allowing only
restricted use of affirmative action. 105 Moreover, in constitutional
decisions expressing its own best understanding of racial equality,
the Court had rebuffed efforts to define "disparate impact" as discrimination.106 Thus, Brennan would not have been able to secure
firm support for a "rupture" with color blindness in favor of a result
orientation.
In order to distinguish Weber from Bakke, Brennan needed a
different kind of argument. He had to accentuate the private nature of the affirmative action in Weber, as opposed to the federally
subsidized state program in Bakke. His discussion of the overall
goals of Title VII in promoting black interests arguably distinguished it from other portions of the 1964 Act with narrower
goals,107 but realistically, little justification existed for attributing
fundamentally divergent purposes to various parts of the Act. For
this reason, Brennan's second argument was particularly important
because it rested on a statutory provision, section 703(j), that had
no counterpart in Bakke and related to a well-established tradition
of employer autonomy in labor law. In short, rather than announcing a brave new interpretation of the concept of discrimination,
Brennan structured his opinion precisely to avoid the necessity of
such a conceptual leap.
Perhaps Brennan could have carried the day in Weber with a
broader, more conceptual opinion. Because two Justices - Stevens and Powell - had recused themselves, he needed only to hold
his four-Justice block from Bakke to "win" the case. But this would
have been a pyrrhic victory because of the likelihood that a 4-3 win
would be overturned as soon as the full Court heard another affirmative action case. Hence, he needed to pick up Justice Stewart's
vote and preferably to stake out a position that Justice Powell
104. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
105. In Bakke, four Justices held that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, whose language is rather similar to that of Title VII, bans all affirmative action by recipients of federal
funds. See 438 U.S. 265, 408-21 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart &
Rehnquist, JJ.). Justice Powell equated the statutory antidiscrimination standard with the
concept of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and held that the latter allows
affirmative action only in the presence of a compelling governmental interest such as remedying past illegal discrimination or attaining diversity in an educational institution. See 438
U.S. at 281-320. For a case from the Johnson era showing a similar lack of enthusiasm for
affirmative action in a constitutional setting, see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267
(1986) (invalidating layoff plan designed to prevent erosion of diversity).
106. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
107. Brennan relegated his effort to draw this distinction to a footnote and cited only two
passing remarks in the Congressional Record. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979).
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would also be willing to endorse in future cases. In addition, Justice
Blackmun's concurrence makes it clear that he would have had
great difficulty in joining a broader opinion. Justice Brennan's
opinion in Weber was almost certainly the best outcome he could
obtain. Despite its inadequacy under conventional legal criteria,
Justice Brennan's opinion brilliantly succeeded in dealing with the
situation he faced on the Court, confirming his reputation as an outstanding tactician.
In reality, rather than endorsing affirmative action, the thrust of
Weber was to privatize it. Later cases highlight the Court's determination to allow voluntary affirmative action under Title VII while
providing a much cooler reception to coercive affirmative action,
even by a federal court.1os Indeed, the Court went so far as to distinguish a program created by a consent decree, voluntary and
therefore permissible, from one created by a judicial modification
of a consent decree, coercive and therefore closely scrutinized.109
Thus, despite its analytic difficulties, the line identified by Weber
between voluntary and coerced programs stood the test of time. 110
Rather than being a rupture, Justice Brennan's decision has
more of the reconciliatory quality of Judge Mack in Gay Rights. 111
While leaving affirmative action in the public sector restricted
under Bakke and its successor cases, the Court left more leeway in
the less politicized private sphere. It thus attempted to reconcile
the original expectations of the statute's framers with the perceived
needs of the black community and the practical needs of the business community. Only one group was left out of this concord white blue-collar workers, who were soon to manifest their political
displeasure. 112 Although, as in the abortion area, the Court's prediction of the future may have failed to anticipate the backlash
108. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding voluntary
employer plan under lenient standard of review); Local No. 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (upholding affirmative action consent decree regardless of whether court would have had power to enter same decree as remedy for proven
violation).
109. In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), the Court overturned a lower court order adjusting layoffs in order to preserve gains under an affirmative
action plan. In Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), the Court upheld a judicial affirmative action order only after careful scrutiny to determine its necessity. But in Local 93, the
Court required such scrutiny only when an affirmative action plan Jacked the consent of the
employer, as when it was a judicial modification of a consent decree as opposed to being part
of the decree itself. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 528.
110. Notably, recent opposition to affirmative action, such as the current California initiative proposal, is also focused on government-mandated programs. See Deborah Malamud,
The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2260 n.105 (1995)
(quoting California initiative).
111. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). See also supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
112. The rise of the conservative wing of the Republican party to national power under
Ronald Reagan received a considerable boost from white opposition to affirmative action.
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against what it considered progressive views, Justice Brennan's
Weber approach has managed to survive for almost a generation. It
remains to be seen whether, as Bickel asked about the Warren
Court, the Weber Court's gamble on the future will pay off in the
end.113
C. Final Thoughts on Weber
On conventional legal grounds, Justice Brennan's opinion is far
less satisfactory than Justice Rehnquist's. Yet, it is difficult to endorse the Rehnquist opinion wholeheartedly, particularly its tone of
self-righteousness. In his closing, Justice Rehnquist invokes the
spirit of the Act, which rings out with "unmistakable clarity" "[i]t is equality." 114 He then quotes Senator Dirksen's statement
that "[e]quality of opportunity ... is the mass conscience of mankind that speaks in every generation, and it will continue to speak
long after we are dead and gone." 115 Nothing is more destructive to
equality than the quota, which Justice Rehnquist calls "a creator of
castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order to prefer
another."116 In passing Title VII, Justice Rehnquist continues, Congress outlawed "all racial discrimination, recognizing that no discrimination based on race is benign, that no action disadvantaging a
person because of his color is affirmative." 11 7
Rousing language, but a little grating when we recall its authorship. Justice Rehnquist's stirring belief in racial equality was seemingly absent in 1954, when he was a law clerk during the Brown
case, or during the civil rights movement, which he opposed.118 Indeed, even during his distinguished career on the Court, little sign
can be seen of a desire to eradicate racial inequality. Justice Brennan says that it would be "ironic indeed" if the effect of the 1964
See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893,
897-98 (1994).
113. BICKEL, supra note 66, at 173.
114. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
115.
116.
117.
118.

443 U.S. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CoNG. REc. 14,510 (1964)).
Weber, 443 U.S. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
443 U.S. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
At the time of the 1964 Act, Justice Rehnquist strongly opposed a similar public-

accommodation law in Phoenix. See 8 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATION OF SUPREME
CouRT JUSTICES 357 (Roy Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1977) [hereinafter SUPREME
CoURT HEARINGS]. Ten years earlier, he drafted a memo for Justice Jackson defending the
separate-but-equal rule. There is some debate about the surrounding circumstances, but certainly no evidence that he supported the result in Brown at the time. See MARK TusHNET,
MAKING CIVIL R1mrrs LAw 190 (1994). As late as 1974, Justice Rehnquist's sensitivity to
racial issues was sufficiently low that he overlooked his lawyer's notice of a restrictive racial
covenant on property he was purchasing. See l2A SUPREME COURT HEARINGS, supra, at

v.

1510-11 (1989).
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Civil Rights Act were to block voluntary efforts to diminish
inequality.119 It is at least equally ironic that the spirit of the Act
should be trumpeted so valiantly by those having least sympathy
with its passage.120
Yet Justice Brennan's opinion is also unsatisfactory. Although a
tactical success in terms of coalition building, it gives little credence
to the critical statutory text or the legislative history. It also ignores
reality to the extent that much "voluntary" affirmative action was in
fact a response to government pressure, whether in the form of
threatened litigation or federal contracting rules. 121 Finally, as later
events have made clear, it was dangerously dismissive toward the
interests and views of white workers, who responded by abandoning liberalism as an ideology.
Hard cases make bad law not because judges are weak or stupid,
but because hard cases often have no really good solutions. In
Weber, the Court faced a choice between more or less unsatisfactory solutions, Of the available options in Weber, the approach
sketched in Justice Blackmun's concurrence, and later elaborated
by Justice O'Connor,122 seems to do the least total damage to the
legal fabric. It would allow affirmative action only to correct or
avoid statistical disparities between the employer's hiring or promotion and the relevant qualified labor pool. This solution is not
wholly satisfactory. It strains somewhat against the text of Title VII
and its legislative history, but not to the breaking point. It would
give blacks less than they might fairly claim as a matter of social
justice because it ignores the lingering effects of pre-enactment discrimination. It would not be wholly satisfactory to white workers,
but it does not treat them as harshly as Justice Brennan's solution.
It is, in short, the least unsatisfactory among the flawed options
available.
This interpretation rests on the theory that the statute should
not be construed to be self-defeating. Consider, by analogy, a statute that forbids starting fires in a state park. It would be one thing
to construe the statute to permit any fire that would advance the
statute's general purpose of making the park enjoyable. That inter119. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204.
120. Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson presents a similar irony. In arguing for an interpretation of Title VII according to what he considers its clear language, he waxes indignantly
on the injustice played by affirmative action on white workers. Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Though his concerns in Johnson may
well have some foundation, the irony remains: When has he ever shown similar anger at
discrimination against blacks? See generally Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream:
Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia's Mccleskey
Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1035, 1038, 1061, 1078, 1086 (1994).
121. Justice Blackmun's opinion is more candid in this respect. See Weber, 443 U.S. at
209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649-53.
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pretation is analogous to Justice Brennan's position in Weber. It is
another matter, however, to allow a backfire to be set when the
park is threatened by a forest fire. Like the "arguable violation"
theory under Title VII, allowing backfires only seeks to save the
statute from the irony of self-defeat.
The Blackmun-O'Connor interpretation of Title VII is, like
most compromises, a bit unsatisfactory on general principle. Perhaps, however, Hadrian would approve of this effort to make the
law worthy of the allegiance of all groups within our society.
As the example of Weber shows, Eskridge's analysis may not
always win converts even from sympathetic audiences. In the end,
he may not even have a coherent dogma that a convert might embrace, for his "critical pragmatism" seems as much a style of analysis as a coherent theory. But engaging Eskridge's ideas can force us
to deepen our own thinking and come to a greater awareness of the
profound issues posed by statutory interpretation. That is enough
to make Dynamic Statutory Interpretation an important book.

